The article studies a complex of little known historical processes in Southwestern Maluku and East Timor in the late 17th century. These occurred in the intersection between early colonial attempts at political and economic control, and local strategies to either accommodate or avoid such control. The article argues that the aspirations of European or Eurasian groups -the Dutch VOC and the ethnically mixed Portuguese Topasses -allowed certain local leaders to use early colonial rivalries to build up positions that transgressed their customary prerogatives. Moreover, the processes must be seen as an interplay between global, regional and local spatial levels. The article focuses in particular on two protagonists. Bakker, a chief in the island of Kisar, was briefly expelled through a Topass invasion in 1668 but reinstated by a Dutch expeditionary force, henceforth cooperating closely with the Dutch post in Banda. Sili Saba (Raja Salomon), was the ruler of Ade (Vemasse) in East Timor. An attempt to ally with the VOC in 1668 misfired as the Topasses invaded East Timor in the same year, and Sili Saba was installed as interlocutor for the VOC in Wetar. The article shows how the Wetar Straits, which had a binding function for culturally similar populations, was turned into a sea border which still persists. It also demonstrates how local groups obstructed the imposed order through resistance and migrations.
Introduction
Tambagga Suassa, [copper alloy] is only found on the island of Timor … I was personally told by Radja Salomon, the erstwhile King of Ade, that there was a piece in front of his house that he used for a chair, and that it required 100 men to carry it up the Mountain, but the same was taken from him by the Portuguese in 1665, causing a great deal of strife, with the result that in the end he had to flee this country. (Rumphius 1999: 235) to provide the attentive European with stories of the riches of his lost homeland. Items such as copper and ambergris had, as it seemed, just barely eluded the Dutch East India Company (VOC) which Rumphius served, and been brutally appropriated by their Portuguese rivals. When Salomon spoke to Rumphius he was himself a refugee, but not a landless one. In fact the VOC had assisted him in carving out a chiefdom on nearby Wetar where he was busy with political and economic manoeuvres, with or without Dutch approval. The political alterations in the Wetar Straits in the late 17th century are highly interesting as exemplifying the inauguration of early modern colonial subordination. It is a complex amalgamation of strategic and economic motives, of indigenous and external aspirations, and of interplay between local, regional and global aggregate levels (see Figure 1 ). The rise of Western ascendancy over Asia is currently a hotly debated topic, where arguments focusing on European dynamism are countered by revisionist arguments that stress the role of contingency and chance in explaining Western overseas expansion. Even scholars maintaining European uniqueness have pointed out that expansion in Asia was decisively helped by the complicity of indigenous groups, bringing an 'Asian agency' into the picture (Anievas and Nisancioglu 2017: 65) . What is certain is that the extant sources reveal an intricate interplay between European and indigenous peoples which shaped the course of the colonial presence in maritime Southeast Asia. In a Maluku context, this interplay has found analysts in scholars such as Leonard Andaya (1993) and Gerrit Knaap (2004) , who have both shown the possibilities offered by a close reading of the colonial archive, when tracing developments in indigenous societies which otherwise possess few written historical sources. Reports and logs written by administrators and captains provide a wealth of detail about daily interaction in the contact zones. However, one must not forget the limitations of these sources, which usually only describe what was of immediate concern for European-led trade and strategy.
There are nevertheless areas that were deeply involved in the early modern struggles for colonial supremacy in eastern Indonesia, but have received limited attention from either historians or anthropologists. One significant area was known as Maluku's Southwestern islands (in modern Indonesian, Kepulauan Barat Daya), located close to East Timor with which the islands share some linguistic and cultural characteristics. 1 In the second half of the 17th century, East Timor and the islands Wetar and Kisar, were involved in a political game that led to demographic relocations over the Wetar Straits. The events are epitomised by the fates of two enterprising individuals. The first is the aforementioned Raja Salomon of Ade, whose eventful career entailed extensive travelling in the East Indies, and eventually resulted in his position as a baptised immigrant raja at the head of a refugee community (McWilliam 2007: 228) . The other is Bakker, the chief of Kisar who tried to secure a leading intermediate position in the region by using the VOC against the Portuguese and local rivals. These realignments and their socio-economic implications will be the subject of this article. The aim is to investigate the agency of Timor and Maluku groups in the face of external threats and attempts of dominance, and to analyse how a colonial border was drawn in waters that previously had binding functions; incidentally a border that is still in operation. The argument is that the quest for economic and political control that went on at three levels -global, regional and local -enabled certain local leaders to use European and Eurasian rivalries and ambitions to build up new positions of authority, using foreign equipment and symbolic tools. And, equally important, it is argued that the division of early colonial spheres enabled an element of state avoidance where groups of people managed their economic activities and even migration outside of colonial control, to a certain extent paralleling the Southeast Asian highland groups studied by James Scott (2009) . As pointed out by Leonard Andaya (1993) , David Henley (2002) and Victor Lieberman (2009: 866) , early Dutch colonialism was not merely predatory, but was frequently solicited by indigenous groups who saw the foreignness of the Dutch as an asset that could be used to further their aims. For a later period of Timor history, Ricardo Roque (2010) has elaborated the concept of mutual parasitism to characterise the relation between the Portuguese regime and the local elites, who used each other's resources to further warlike aims. The small world of the Wetar Straits provides an intriguing case of similar processes.
Dutch-Portuguese rivalry and indigenous societies
To understand the events that unfolded, we must sketch the background of the colonial rivalries in the region, and the indigenous societies that were affected. By the 1660s, the European contest for the spices of Maluku had long since been resolved in favour of the VOC. A Dutch-Portuguese peace treaty was publicised in 1663 and left Portugal with an ill-defined sphere of influence in Timor, East Flores and adjacent islands. The trade in valuable sandalwood made the possession of this region vital. It was mainly extracted from the western part of the island, where the Portuguese settled in Lifau by the late 1650s (de Roever: 2002) . The official Portuguese organisation in Asia, Estado da Índia, had few resources to spare, and the Portuguese authority was upheld by the Topasses or Black Portuguese, a mixed group of white Portuguese, Dutch renegades, Flores, Timor, Indians, Blacks, etc. (Andaya 2010; Andaya and Andaya 2012; Boxer: 1947) . Their Dutch rivals maintained a toehold in Kupang in Timor which made the Topasses the main players in the Timor waters. The Banda post, which oversaw a system of nutmeg plantations worked by slave labour, monitored the islands in southern Maluku, which occasionally brought it in contact with Timor. Being a rare example of a plantation system of a 'West Indian' type, the Banda authorities were obliged to secure continuous influx of slaves, with consequences for their relationship with the island societies (Winn 2010) . A third force was the Makassar double kingdom of Gowa and Tallo', which lodged claims on Timor's north coast and Alor, and forced some coastal polities to yield tribute. The Makassar threat against the Dutch spice monopoly in Maluku was part of the background of the Makassar War in 1667 (Andaya 1981: 65-66; Lieberman 2009: 859) .
The societies in and around Timor were based on genealogical groups and strongly hierarchical in structure. They were organised in small polities with maybe a few thousand souls (Castro 1867: 310; Schulte Nordholt 1971) . Rainfall was limited and agriculture could not sustain large populations. The Ade 'kingdom' consisted of two divisions called Vemasse and Watte Soul, with a number of settlements which acted through mutual consensus (Hägerdal 2007: 556-557) . Across the Wetar Straits, the mountainous Wetar (Etter) was even more sparsely populated by speakers of a set of languages related to the Timor Galoli. Unlike Timor there was nothing remotely approaching kingdoms, but rather a set of autonomous settlements, referred by the Dutch as negorijen (Malay: negeri). Today the Adang people of Alor claims to have been overlords over Wetar in ancient times, but this cannot be confirmed from archival sources (Wellfelt 2016: 277) . In 1681 there were reportedly 442 able-bodied men in eleven negeri excluding the hill tribes. Populations in the various villages were typically low, with the number of ablebodied men ranging from 12 to 70.
2 A large part of the settlements mentioned in the census does not occur in later maps and descriptions, perhaps indicating some demographic reshuffling over time. A certain tension between communities at the coast and in the hills could be found. In spite of the small dimensions of the negeri, there was a pronounced social division in nobles, free people, and slaves, similar to the Timor mainland.
The historical background of Wetar is obscure. Little is known about the island before 1669, though the various settlements may have paid annual tribute to the Sultan of Ternate in order to gain protection from unwelcome seafarers from Pulo, Bungaya and Tobungku in Sulawesi ( van Dam 1927: 206) . A highly interesting early account is provided by the dagh-register of Joannes de Hartog who visited the island in 1681:
Wetar is actually the inhabitants' name of the island, which is 70 to 80 miles wide and long. At most places it is full of high and craggy mountains in whose holes and caves the Alfurs 3 live. They have very little communication or intercourse with the coastal dwellers, excepting the barter of beeswax. At many places it takes place like this. The coastal Wetar people place this or that trade goods at certain places in the evening, offering them to the Alfurs who place as much beeswax there. If it is not enough, the coastal people let their goods remain until the requested wax arrives. They take away this in the evening, and the Alfurs carry off the bartered clothes. If the wax is not ready, the Alfurs place a rope of rattan in the wood with as many knots as they demand days for delivery. The land of the lowland Wetar people is famous for having much, nay, even opulent amounts of beeswax. Then, more than twothirds are lost due to the lack of manpower. I could also annotate on the 14th [of May 1681] that less than 1,000 people live in the known places. This is the reason why the inhabitants, apart from ironwork, red karikam, bafta, 4 other textiles, etc. also are very keen to buy slaves in order to gather the beeswax. This nation is, like on all the surrounding islands, of a very tardy and lazy nature. They mostly live off honey, kelapa [coconut], jagung [maize] and other forest products. However, they now begin to plant some sorghum here and there, being induced by Raja Salomon. Generally they give no proof of religion, 5 and there is very little respect between an orangkaya 6 and a subject. In spite of the prejudiced views of the Dutchman, the account gives hints of the local system of economic redistribution, including indigenous slavery, and the relatively informal communication between lord and follower. To keep such a scattered society under surveillance, the VOC eventually established a stranger lord, under circumstances that will be explained. Due to its small size, Kisar appears more coherent, and as with Wetar it has a pronounced three-tiered social hierarchy. The main ethnic group, the Meher, belongs to the Austronesian Southeast Timor linguistic division, but there is also a Papuan-speaking group in Oirata in the south. Kisar traditions refer to a very old division between the Meher and the Oirata. According to their own claims the Oirata were the original inhabitants, and in early times they moved between Timor and Kisar. Later on, new waves from the Kei islands and Luang would have given rise to the Meher population (Sahusilawane 2008: 24-26; Soewarsono et al. 2011 ). Kisar's agriculture was varied enough to support a dense population; a relation from 1681 mentions 570 able-bodied men excluding Oirata. People lived on rice, kacang (beans), potatoes and ubi (tubers).
8 Like Wetar, it nevertheless suffered from a relatively low level of technological sophistication in terms of weaponry and agricultural tools which made these island societies vulnerable to foreign encroachment, the more since they were not yet included in a world religious system and therefore the objects of raiding and slaving.
Both islands had resources that attracted Southeast Asian and European groups. Sandalwood, beeswax and slaves were the mainstay items of export on Timor during the 17th and 18th centuries. The beeswax of Wetar was used for candles and as a watertight substance in the era before plastic and rubber. Also, the sea to the north of East Timor was the home of sea turtles whose shell, known as karet or sisir, was a valuable item. Kisar also produced textiles. According to tradition, the Kisar traders grew rich in pre-VOC times by trading slaves and spices in the islands of southern Maluku, making profits in 4 Mostly Indian cotton textiles. 5 Meaning that they did not conform to religious practices as known by the Europeans. Like other peoples in eastern Indonesia the Wetar believed in the power of the spirit world. Melaka and later on Lifau in Timor. By the 19th century they used sizeable boats deriving from the island Luang further to the southeast, and sailed to Timor, Alor, Wetar and the islands to the north (Riedel: 1886: 402, 427 ). Luang's historical standing is indicated by origin myths from Wetar and Kisar, and at least part of the trading network is confirmed by VOC sources, although there is also reference to Kisar's poverty in foodstuff and lack of any good anchorage.
9 Kisar was also known to be rich in gold, largely perhaps brought in from Timor since there is no indigenous mining. Golden moons, plates and earrings in southern Maluku usually came from Kisar and Luang, and objects manufactured in Kisar were also exported to Timor (de Jonge and van Dijk 1995: 102, 110) . At times this wealth came at a cost. In 1643-44 the Sultan of Ternate dispatched a fleet which captured numerous prisoners as well as gold and silver, without meeting serious resistance. Supposedly, this pushed part of the island's elite to seek Dutch protection.
10 A VOC envoy handed over a Dutch flag to the local chief Bakker (Pakar) in 1662, thus formally placing the island under VOC authority. 11 Missives from that year indicate that the authorities of the Banda post were anxious to incorporate the various islands in the southwest into their network. The reasons were both political and economic; peace with Portugal had not yet been announced, and it was imperative to eradicate spice plantations outside of Banda to ensure the VOC's monopoly.
The problem of rationally choosing the VOC as allies over other options is illustrated by what follows. When the Dutch returned in July 1665 to renew the alliance, Bakker seemed less than enthusiastic. News spread fast in the region, and words had reached the chief of the poor behaviour of the Europeans on Leti island. Bakker was also unsure what the VOC alliance would lead to as he knew little about the Europeans: the Makassar used to visit the island every year, while he had only seen the Dutch twice in his life. Eventually, however, a formal contract was concluded, and the Dutch representatives visited his negeri, which was situated on a mountain top in the inland and was surrounded by a stone pagger (fence). This detail is interesting since it accords with later descriptions of stone fortresses in southern Maluku. 12 The procedure had an element of popular participation: 400 subjects were asked if they approved of the contract and answered 'yes'. 13 This would have been a large majority of the male Meher population. The custom that a chief could not take decisions without general consent is found in other parts of southern Maluku in the 17th century, such as Aru (van Dijk 1859: 9-10). The contract forbade contacts with other European or Asian nations; it was concluded at a time when the Second AngloDutch War (1665-67) was brewing and the English were trying to establish themselves on the sulphur-producing island of Damar, and also at a time when Makassar seafarers wrought havoc in the region (Stapel, 1931 329-31; Lamper n.d.: 13, 18) . Although Kisar was small it was well placed to assist the Dutch appropriation of regional products; Bakker offered to procure slaves, beeswax, turtle shell and sandalwood to sell to the VOC, an idea that Batavia welcomed.
14 Together with Sili Saba, this enterprising chief 9 VOC 1275, Report, 1670, f. 311.
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C. Visser, Report, 6 September 1645, Coll. Hudde, no. 27, NA; Riedel (1886: 402); Richardson and Richardson (2017a would become a cornerstone in the Dutch attempts to contain the Portuguese and others in spite of the hesitant beginnings of the relationship.
Topass invasion
In this section we will trace the chain of events that unfolded in 1668-69. There were two catalysts for the conflict. One was the unclear political loyalties of the main ports of East Timor, Manatuto and Ade, whose political structure was weak or rather decentralised (McWilliam 2007) . These places were loosely asserted by the Makassar and Portuguese, claims that implied a loose suzerainty that shifted with the relative strength of the overlord, and was enforced in order to obtain valuable products. A Dutch scouting expedition in 1665 found that the two ports delivered beeswax and slaves, and heard (incorrect) stories of rich copper deposits, echoed in the quoted work by Rumphius. Part of the inhabitants actively asked that the Company should expel the Makassar (Hägerdal 2007: 556-558) . Ade was dominated by two brothers, Sili Saba and Ama Galy, whose relations with each other were poor due to an issue of 'inheritance', not further explained in the sources. Another matter concerned Kisar. Exactly what occurred in the years before 1668 will presumably never be known, but different sources suggest that Portuguese blood was spilt in the first place. Historical tradition as rendered by Riedel (1886: 401-402 ) tells that the chief of Wonreli subdued the rival negeri Nohowali, which later asked for help from the Portuguese in Timor. A first Portuguese invasion was beaten back, but a second one ravaged Kisar and captured a large part of the population as slaves. This caused the islanders to approach the Dutch. Contemporary sources mention Portuguese claims that some of their ships arriving in Kisar a few years before 1668 had been overtaken by the islanders, and that the crews had been massacred. The slaying of a Catholic padre was seen as particularly atrocious. 15 Other documents indicate that the Portuguese were incensed over a trip that Bakker had undertaken to Banda in 1667, meaning that they probably saw the islands to the north of East Timor as lying within their sphere of interest. Another factor was perhaps the 1667 VOC-Makassar war which had recently weakened seaborne competitors from south Sulawesi and encouraged Portuguese expansion.
At any rate, a considerable fleet of korakora (outriggers) under the Portuguese leader António Hornay approached Kisar in March 1668. The ships came from Larantuka, Lifau, Manatuto, Barnusa, Pandai and Alor. Perplexingly, the three last mentioned places were Muslim communities in the Alor archipelago that belonged to a political alliance called Galiyao that was vaguely within the VOC sphere (Hägerdal 2010) . In fact the Alor people allegedly took the initiative for the invasion. In spite of the rather inaccessible mountain-rimmed coastline of Kisar, the marauders rapidly penetrated the island, plundering and killing people indiscriminately. A redoubt with a cannon gate was built to reduce Bakker's own negeri, and hand grenades were used in the assault. Thus the Topasses used modern European military technology as well as indigenous allies and means of transportation.
Bakker, his family, and retainers escaped at the last minute and stayed in Maccatoua in the Fatuluku-speaking area of Timor. This may be significant in regard to later migrations 15 VOC 892, Missive, Batavia to Banda, 10 January 1669, f. 75.
between Kisar and the Fataluku lands. Other inhabitants were less lucky. Some 430 people were carried off in captivity, the large majority being women and children. In the smallscale societies of eastern Indonesia, slaving was common among European and Asian groups alike. In the three or four-tiered hierarchies in the region, slaves and serfs formed the lowest category (Castro 1867: 201) Woman and children were easier to handle than adult men and were more likely to be captured by societies without plantations demanding hard labour. The Dutch plantation system in Banda was not matched by conditions in the Portuguese-ruled areas.
Shortly after, a VOC expedition under Jan Blinne appeared in the region. Blinne met with Bakker who appears to have made a strategic decision to throw in his lot with the Dutch. Part of the background was the lack of unity even on relatively small islands, which could be found in much of Maluku. Bakker confided to Blinne that 'a large part' of his people had actually sided with the Portuguese and their accomplices. It was now that the chief came up with the idea that the VOC should establish a stronghold on Kisar, at least for some time, with the purpose of re-installing him in his land. His personal situation was desperate. He, his wife and children had nothing to eat. The Dutch lent him a few Indian pieces of cloth, highly valued import goods that could be bartered for necessities. Blinne then sailed back to Banda.
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At the time when these events took place, Portugal was stable and for the moment peaceful in Europe. However, the sequence of events showed that politics among the early colonial powers in the East Indies took on its own trajectory. The Banda council reacted quickly on the report of the invasion. Maarten Roos was ordered to lead a military expedition consisting of a fluyt (Dutch cargo ship) and two sloops with 106 soldiers and sailors. While the size of the fleet was modest, it outdid the Portuguese korakora in firepower as by this time the Dutch had the naval military capacity to overcome even sophisticated Asian opponents such as the Chinese (Andrade 2016: 202-210) . The aim was to capture the pirates and bring them to Banda if possible. Furthermore the ships were to bring Bakker to Kisar and build a wooden fort with his assistance.
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On 7 May 1668 Roos found Hornay's fleet at a sand bay in Leti and attacked it without waiting for the fluyt. Most of the korakora lay beneath a wooded rock that offered excellent protection for the Portuguese musketeers. Every Dutch approach was greeted with murderous fire. As evening fell they broke off the attack after suffering 12 dead and wounded.
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The next morning the fluyt arrived and the fleet prepared to pound the Portuguese vessels. Now Hornay was in a precarious position and negotiations began. Hornay's envoys assured Roos that the Portuguese were unaware that Kisar or Leti belonged to the VOC, but rather wished to take revenge for previous bloodshed. Roos was unconvinced, but agreed that Hornay would return the captives and booty. Then came the second Dutch failure. During the night Hornay skilfully used the wet and windy weather to his advantage and managed to extract his fleet before the very eyes of the Dutch. However, the surviving prisoners, 326 people in miserable condition, were immediately repatriated. As might be expected, there was a general feeling of gratefulness to the VOC as a considerable part of the Kisar population had been spared the fate of the slave market. 19 In the circumstances, it may have been forgotten that the VOC itself was on the hunt for slaves suitable for what would be a short and miserable life on the Banda plantations. From Kisar, one of the sloops picked up Bakker who was accompanied by a hundred men from Maccatoua. During May and June he followed the VOC ships along the coast of East Timor on his own insistence, as he could serve as interpreter and assist in the purchase of slaves for Banda. Exploiting fear of the Portuguese, the VOC took the opportunity to seal contracts with the Timor petty kings of Manatuto, Ade, Hera, Lacló, Waimaa and Laivai, offering the prospect of strong Dutch intervention should the Portuguese resume claims of overlordship (Hägerdal 2012: 169-170; Stapel 1931: 392-398) . The fact that they had successfully assisted Bakker and forced Hornay's fleet to leave must have made an impression. In Ade, the Dutch had a helpful meeting with the ruler Sili Saba. 20 Whether Sili Saba previously knew Bakker is not stated in the otherwise detailed VOC records, but he certainly became a Timor counterpart to his Kisar colleague, a prop that the VOC used to anchor their authority in this volatile part of maritime Southeast Asia. Despite some of the local elites accommodating the Portuguese, Sili Saba appears to have thrown in his lot with the VOC at an early stage.
That impression was not, however, an impediment to the ambitions of Mateus da Costa, António Hornay's rival for supremacy over the Portuguese community in Timor and Flores. In his correspondence with the VOC, he argued that East Timor had been subordinated by Portugal since the early 17th century. He then led a violent expedition to East Timor in the fall of 1668, taking slaves by the score. Manatuto was quick to side with the intruders, as did a part of Ade where Ama Galy submitted to the new overlords -a move that did not help him since he was soon hanged by the Portuguese. 21 While da Costa took a calculated risk in attacking VOC allies, he may have been aware that this was outside the traditional sphere of VOC interests. The vague Makassar supremacy over some spots on the Timor coast including Ade had just been broken following the disastrous war with the VOC in 1667, and the land was available for other political players. In fact da Costa's gamble paid off, as can be seen in the missives of Batavia and Banda. As higher issues of European diplomacy were at stake, and the economic and political advantages in East Timor were not sufficiently obvious, the VOC only lodged a protest to Lifau.
It is at this moment that Wetar appears in the records. As the Portuguese attacked Ade, Sili Saba fled to the Fataluku area in the far east. A new Dutch expedition met him there in January 1669 and brought him along for a visit to Wetar. As a regional man of standing, Sili Saba was useful to the Dutch in their endeavour to scout the economic assets of the unknown island. The close relation between the Wetar languages and that of Ade was probably important here. In that sense Sili Saba filled the role of regional interlocutor as Bakker had done. The first contact was successful as the Wetar inhabitants could procure beeswax for the Dutch and were keen to use the VOC for protection against those from the Alor islands and south Sulawesi.
22 Soon after, Sili Saba retreated to a coastal place in Wetar with his family and an entourage of 200 persons. He would spend most of his remaining years on this island despite searching for opportunities to return to Ade with Dutch assistance. As shown above, the crude borders between the colonial spheres were created through a brief undeclared war that defied the diplomatic relations of the metropolitan governments. The initiatives were regional; the Topass invasion was launched by Hornay in Larantuka, while the Dutch counter-attack was initiated by Banda without approval from Batavia. If the concept of 'sea' is used as a politico-economic entity rather than a strictly geographical category, the struggle highlighted overlapping claims between a 'Topass Sea' and a 'Banda VOC Sea' where the two protagonists had built up positions in the preceding years (cf. Andaya 2016) . Whilst the battle of Leti and its aftermath did not enter the textbooks on Indonesian history, it made its mark on political developments in eastern Indonesia. It is tempting to compare this episode with that of the East India Company (EIC) officer, Nathaniel Courthope, to hold Banda against the Dutch in 1616-20, during a time of official peace, and the event influenced the early modern colonial division of overseas lands (Milton 1999) . Luckier than Courthope, António Hornay successfully defied the Dutch and secured East Timor, laying the basis of a political division which is still visible on the map today (Boxer 1947) .
Creating vassalage in Wetar
How were the VOC-backed chiefs in Wetar and Kisar established after the events of 1668-69, and how did they attempt to strengthen their political and economic capabilities while maintaining cordial relations with the colonial suzerain? Some clues may be found in an interesting traditional account, recorded in the late 19th century, which details Sili Saba's arrival in Wetar. While not reliable in the details, it provides a local perspective on the acculturation of a refugee group on the island.
According to this narrative, two chiefs in Vemasse (on Ade), Sili Saba and Boko Mauk, vied for power. Boko Mauk received a banner and a staff from the Portuguese which gave him the right to rule the place as raja. In the war that followed, Vemasse was burnt and Sili Saba went with some of his troops to Wetar. The Timor brought with them plants of banana, sago and pinang (betel). Two local chiefs who saw Sili Saba's men planting approached him and suggested that he should not plant at the upper reaches since the trees would not grow there. Subsequently, people from Sau also heard of Sili Saba's undertaking and provided conflicting advice, namely that the trees must not be planted at the lower reaches. Sili Saba followed their instructions which turned out to be judicious. He subsequently moved to Sau where he established the negeri Ilwaki. Since he was displeased with the people there, he sailed to Batavia and asked the Dutch for a banner to strengthen his authority, which he received. Back in Ilwaki he was honoured as raja by all people and installed various orangkaya, his fame growing day by day (Munawar 1980: 15-16 ). The story is interesting in several ways. It depicts Sili Saba's exile as resulting from an internal Timor power struggle rather than just Portuguese intervention. The account stresses the peaceful nature of his establishment as ruler, and indicates the symbolic capital of VOC tokens of power. The raja also has traits of a cultural hero since he brings useful plants from Timor. It is instructive to compare this with contemporary sources. His visit to Batavia is actually well attested, though the Dutch documents suggest that his exit from Wetar had more to do with poor conditions than with dissatisfaction with the locals; in fact, more than a hundred followers had succumbed from starvation by 1671. The sources indicate that he became thoroughly familiar with Dutch-Asian life in Batavia and Banda, where he stayed for periods up to 1680 (de Haan 1907: 13, 513, 519) . Most notable is his baptism on 10 February 1674 in a ceremony conducted in Malay, one of the baptismal witnesses being no less than Cornelis Speelman, the conqueror of Makassar and soon to be governorgeneral. The Timor raja fittingly received the name Salomon Speelman. The sincerity of his conversion was not questioned by his Dutch contemporaries, particularly as he asked for Christian schoolmasters to educate his entourage (van der Chijs 1902: 63). Naturally, serious interest in Christianity did not exclude the practical aspect of shoring up support for his overarching concern, to be restored as ruler in Timor.
The reason why Raja Salomon, as we can now call him, was permanently placed in Wetar was mainly strategic. The Supreme Government of the VOC saw no prospects for a restoration adventure. In Timor, António Hornay was at the height of his power, suppressing resistance in West and East Timor and maintaining a Topass detachment of 30 men in Ade. 23 Perhaps most important, relations between the United Provinces (precursor of the Netherlands) and the King of Portugal were amicable and effectively excluded intervention in Ade. The decision to return to Wetar in 1680 was taken after long deliberations between Salomon and the VOC council in Banda. Residence in Kisar was not a good option as there was a certain rivalry with Bakker, and Salomon could not think of ceding his supposedly higher rank. The VOC provided a token force of six soldiers to accompany him which proved sufficient to deter Portuguese assaults (de Haan 1912: 79, 359) . Contracts concluded in 1670 and 1680 implied the delivery of the local beeswax to the Dutch in return for VOC protection. The arrangement gave Salomon an essential role, to keep unwanted foreign traders away.
The traditional account is generally correct in depicting the transfer of Salomon's party to Wetar as peaceful, albeit with certain tensions. On a promontory by Ilwaki, a wooden palisade with two bastions was erected, which, though ramshackle, served as a warning for outsiders, and a site of respect for the Wetar. Joannes de Hartog related in 1681 that Raja Salomon's authority was strengthened with the support of most of the orangkaya; however, he sometimes commanded them 'somewhat sharply' in ways that went beyond his prerogative. For that reason some chiefs tried to avoid contact with him. They told the VOC representatives in Kisar that they had received him as a refugee and allowed him a safe place to rest, but now he wished to govern them all as an orangkaya.
24
Salomon and his family were unable to exert real, executive power outside the immediate territory of Ilwaki, as the outlying settlements followed their own interests and traded with outsiders ( van Dam 1931: 206-207) .
Salomon is interesting as a historically documented 'stranger king', though on a small scale. Eastern Indonesian history abounds with mostly legendary stories about outsiders who gain acceptance as lords at a place and are able to strike a balance between different genealogical groups and title-holders (Lewis 2010 protection; apart from intra-island tension, the sources make clear that the Wetar were sometimes abused by seaborne neighbouring island groups.
The role of Bakker in Kisar
The respective roles of Salomon and Bakker have some parallels, as they were both minor lords who consistently leaned on VOC support. However, the career of Bakker as lord of Kisar turned out to be considerably different, as will be shown. First, one should note the geographical layout. The larger Wetar with its small and scattered population contrasts with Kisar which can be traversed by foot in less than two hours and has a comparatively dense population (Rodenwaldt 1927: 2) . Kisar therefore had certain preconditions to become politically cohesive. Historical traditions suggest that Bakker's lineage may not have held supremacy on the island for long before the advent of the VOC. Whatever his prerogatives, he was readily acknowledged by the Dutch as the principal lord on the island as laid down in treaties. Similar to Ilwaki, his position was made unassailable by the construction of a VOC fortification, Fort Delfshaven. At the inauguration of the fort, the Dutch feted the orangkaya with arrack, a drink that was highly appreciated by people in the region and often used in solemn and festive occasions. They then reiterated that Bakker was their only headman and that if they were disobedient or unfaithful they could not hope for mercy, but would be punished with death. They 'willingly' agreed to fulfil this. 25 After this time Bakker is often termed 'raja' rather than orangkaya in the documents, indicating that he was seen as a ruler on a par with others with whom the VOC had contracts.
The willingness of the chiefs to acknowledge Bakker as raja is open to debate. The severe Dutch intimidations against potential defectors stemmed from several worrying observations. Divided loyalties seemed to be common, even within the individual orangkaya lineages. A few negeri had sided with the Portuguese during the invasion and paid them with gold in order not to be attacked. Two Kisar renegades captured and interrogated by the Dutch pleaded that this was the only way to save their own lives and the negeri itself. The Dutch spared them on condition that they delivered ten slaves -slaves were, after all, the main economic interest of the Banda post.
26
The explanation of the renegades has a plausible ring; in the small-scale societies of eastern Indonesia, there was little choice for villages but siding with the prevailing strongest power.
In sum, the ascent of Bakker as the prop of Dutch power was not unanimously appreciated and had to be strongly backed by VOC authority. The Dutch sources name several orangkaya of which Bakker appears to have been the primus inter pares. Rivalries between negeri in minor islands were common in eastern Indonesia, as were alliances between negeri in different islands. Against this background, the logical VOC strategy was to back an influential chief by elevating his status and providing him with symbols of power. To some extent Bakker as well as Salomon can be seen as 'men of prowess', whose position stemmed from outstanding capabilities including bonding with the white strangers (cf. Wolters 1999: 115) . 
Resisting VOC vassals
While the upgrading of VOC-affiliated leadership did not entail a large Dutch presence, it had consequences in forms of open resistance. In Wetar as well as Kisar the tension partly went along ethnic and cultural lines. The contradiction between the economies of the coast and the hills is a common one in human societies, and is seen in various islands around Timor. As we have seen, Wetar is a case in point, and Salomon's arrival triggered a clash. A displeased coastal chief, Leki Roma, allied with the highland chief of Peray, a centre of beeswax gathering which claimed Wetar-wide seniority (Riedel 1886: 437) . In 1680 the two chiefs led 30 men in an attack on the pro-VOC village Diriko, killing two people before being driven off. Naturally the VOC representatives saw Leki Roma as a nuisance who impeded the wax trade, the only product on the island of real interest.
27 They tried to invite him to a gathering with the promise of safe conduct, but he preferred to keep away. Only several years later did Salomon come to terms with Leki Roma's son and successor (Coolhaas 1971: 30) .
In Kisar the main division was not between coast and hill, but rather between the Meher and Oirata. Whatever the ethno-historical background, it is clear that the Oirata soon became dissatisfied with Bakker's rule. Like Raja Salomon he appears to have capitalised too much on his VOC connections, and 'made himself too large a lord', seeking his own profit rather than the interests of the people. 28 Here, resistance took the form of an exodus of Oirata people, rather than armed confrontation. The first migration took place around 1670 without the Dutch being able to give the exact reasons. However, the refugees largely returned the following few years, probably from easternmost Timor where a similar language is spoken. 29 Tensions nevertheless arose again when Timor refugees arrived at Oirata 40 years later, triggering a longstanding conflict with the Bakker raja. The Oirata fled to Timor in 1714 and only returned to Kisar in 1727 (Coolhaas 1979: 81-82; van Goor 1988: 17) . The two groups were never really integrated and the Oirata have kept relatively isolated from the Meher over the centuries (van Engelenhoven and Nazarudin 2016: 200; de Josselin de Jong 1937) .
Neither of these cases of defiance were (initially) contingent on direct Dutch impact. Rather, ethno-cultural differences were activated by the new political circumstances brought about by VOC intervention. In the Wetar case, circumscribed economic opportunities with regard to the beeswax trade was probably a factor. Interestingly, there might have been a tendency of countering the Dutch influence with a predisposition for the Portuguese, a tactic well known in Timor (Hägerdal 2012) .
Dutch impact on the local societies
The next question concerns the impact of the Dutch on the societies of Wetar and Kisar, and how it affected the local economies. While the VOC was principally a European commercial organisation, it acquired an element of hybridity and was in a sense an 'Asian' power. Thus Raja Salomon was well accustomed to life in Batavia and the advantages of European technology. Apart from the small VOC guard in Ilwaki, several of his Timor people were skilled in the use of firearms, which gave him a force of 25 good musketeersa significant advantage on an island where the principal weapons were cutlass, lance, bow and arrows (Noegraha and Sanwani 2008: 32) .
The VOC had also religious obligations and non-Muslim areas were to be Christianised as far as possibly (Niemeijer 2001) . De Hartog's visit in Wetar in 1681 was accompanied by activities which clearly blended religious and political authority. There were 43 people baptised including Salomon's wife Johanna, and his eldest daughter. At the same occasion, the royal couple and ten other couples were officially wed. As the raja and his spouse stepped out from the church, de Hartog ordered a salute in the 'Bandanese manner' when 18 soldiers fired their muskets while his yacht fired five cannon shots. 30 The effect was probably not lost on bystanders. A school was established, being the usual method of implanting the seeds of Christianity (Lamper n.d.: 33). The progress on Wetar made its mark on Kisar, where the elites were anxious to invite a Christian mission. 31 The Dutch considered that the zeal of the Kisar was due to jealousy of Raja Salomon's people who regarded themselves as 'higher' on account of their religion. As Christians, the Kisar would have higher status than heathen people. In fact the incumbent Bakker raja was baptised in 1684 together with many of his subjects. The introduction of Christianity was a long and tardy process, though it did help tying the islands to Dutch interests (Lamper n.d.: 33) .
Another aspect of Dutch-indigenous interaction was miscegenation. The garrison in Fort Delfshaven regularly kept local women as informal wives, which soon gave rise to a host of Eurasian children. The women and the offspring resided in a little settlement outside the fort. The Dutch authorities were keen to ensure that the children would receive Christian instruction. 32 This was the origin of the well known mestizo population of Kisar which remained a distinct group on the island until modern times (Rodenwaldt 1927 ). As such, there was nothing peculiar about this: mixed relations were universal in the Euro-Asian contact zones, since few European women followed the perilous routes to Asia (Taylor 2009: 15-17) . The VOC officer Jan Blinne, who had a role in installing colonial presence, was remembered in local Kisar tradition. In one version, the chief of Wonreli gave his daughter in marriage to Blinne (Riedel 1886: 402) . This has not been confirmed by archival sources but indicates the inclusion of the Dutch in the local world-view. Similar stories, where Western foreigners figure in a dynastic-legendary context are found in other parts of maritime Southeast Asia; one may mention Mur Jangkung, a fictionalised version of Jan Pieterszoon Coen in Java (Reid 1994: 292-924) .
But there were also disharmonious aspects of the interaction such as between locals and soldiers or merchants among others. 33 On one occasion Sili Saba was temporarily abducted and intimidated by a burgher trader. 34 freely if there was some issue at hand. The chiefs were quick to recount grave European abuses, which the commander in Fort Delfshaven had some difficulty defending; his main argument was that the Kisar were the laziest people under the sun, and were only willing to work four hours per day. An interesting discussion of local adat followed. The chiefs said that Dutch soldiers randomly confiscated livestock in villages which had been slow to deliver workers. The commander replied that this was no more than normal Kisar custom. The chiefs retorted that this certainly was the case, but could only take place under certain regulated forms. Another issue was how to keep the purchased slaves alive over several months in an island with scarce resources, before the Banda ships collected them. The garrison tried to force the locals to grow ubi and potatoes, which was met with resentment.
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To sum up, there was a degree of VOC interference in Wetar and Kisar in spite of their remoteness and limited profit from trade. While Kisar served as a station for slaves bound for Banda, the Portuguese dominance in East Timor made the supply highly unreliable. In later times, Kisar would be renowned as a producer of high quality textiles which were exported to the islands in the region, though the extent of this in the 17th century is unclear. 36 The two islands were therefore mostly of interest only because of their strategic location, lying in the immediate vicinity of Portuguese Timor.
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In effect, the political system worked tolerably. Bakker's and Salomon's lineages did not appear to question Dutch supremacy. This is confirmed by the presence of Fort Delfshaven and the small post in Ilwaki, and the image of the Dutch in oral traditions seems more positive than in most other places in early Southeast Asia (Engelenhoven and Nazarudin 2016; Reid 1994: 288) . Raja Bakker died about 1680. His Christian descendants would remain the principal lords in Kisar until the end of the colonial period and still have a role as adat leaders (Rodenwaldt 1927: 42) . By contrast, some of Raja Salomon's prerogatives died with him in 1692. His son Johannes ruled in Ilwaki until 1728, after which the line fell in obscurity, at least in Dutch eyes.
38 Unlike in Kisar, Christianity in Wetar waned with weakening communication with the VOC, and by the late 19th century all the chiefs of the island adhered to ancestral beliefs (Noegraha and Sanwani 2008: 82) . This underlines the binding role of Christianity in European-Asian relations, not least in a Maluku context (Niemeijer 2001) .
Keeping 'white and black nations' away During its existence, the VOC concluded a large number of contracts with Asian rulers and chiefs in order to define its sphere of influence and exclude other 'white and black nations'. The more perilous factors were other Europeans and Eurasians. VOC expeditions to the Southwestern islands nervously noted rumours that English ships visited Babar, Damar and Timor's south coast -it should be recalled that this was the period of the Anglo-Dutch wars which had global implications. 39 The French and Danes were also 35 VOC 1374, Dagh-register, J. de Hartog, sub 13 August 1681.
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The Dutch sources do not expand on it (Richardson and Richardson 2017b mentioned as potential intruders. 40 The Portuguese of Larantuka and Lifau made threatening gestures even after 1668, as a minor propaganda war unfolded. They spread the word that they would ravage and subdue the Maluku islands all the way to Aru. Rumour-mongering took on an apocalyptic tone, for example, that the King of Portugal had a key to unleash a large body of water, and drown all inhabitants of the distant Dutch homeland. 41 In fact, however, the Portuguese did not attempt to take hold of the islands to the east of Ataúro. The power of the VOC in Maluku was on the rise in the 1660s and later. The Hornay and da Costa leaders appeared to have realised that they went a step too far with the piratical raid in 1668, and they did not repeat the mistake.
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There remained the 'black nations'. Local traditions from Wetar and Kisar abound with stories of seaborne communication with other islands in the region: Alor, Timor, Roma, Leti, Damar, Luang. 43 The VOC made efforts to stop seafarers from Makassar, Buton, Bima, Seram, Gorom, and Java. 44 In other words, traders from a very wide area aimed for the Southwestern islands, which were on part of the extensive sea routes operated by the east Seramese (Ellen 2003) . Wetar was visited by seafarers from Pandai, Alor and Sulawesi, who had a poor reputation as they sometimes helped themselves to the valuable beeswax by violent means. 45 However, they also brought metal objects and textiles. Makassar activities in eastern Indonesia oscillated between trading and the gathering of sea products, and outright raiding, which partly explains the inclination of many islands in Maluku to accept VOC protection, and to invite Christian rather than Muslim mission. In 1671, for example, the animosity caused people from Lakor and Kisar to attack a Bugis ship and kill the crew with the exception of a woman. 46 The strengthening of VOC authority nevertheless led to the initiation of more peaceful contacts with the Alor islands. Nae Saku, the chief of Dulolong in Alor, was an active trader who promoted closer relations with the Dutch in Kupang and is a well known figure in legend and lore (Hägerdal 2010: 226-229) . In 1681 he had a successful alliance with Raja Salomon. Beeswax was also found in Alor, and Nae Saku sold quantities to Salomon who in turn delivered them to Banda. Together with six Alor chiefs, Nae Saku submitted a formal proposal to Banda to trade with Wetar on an annual basis, though the outcome is not clear from the sources. 47 In 1685 Salomon secretly allowed most of the beeswax to be sold to Alor Muslims, which enraged Banda. 48 The fluctuations between peaceful and hostile Wetar-Alor contacts continued until relatively modern times (Wellfelt 2016: 277-278 Riedel (1886: 432) refers to an unconfirmed abortive Portuguese incursion in Wetar in 1675. a According to other sources there was a skirmish with Solor seafarers in that year.
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Compare the oral traditions recorded in de Josselin de Jong (1937 , 1947 by the Portuguese, to resettle in Kisar, presumably in Oirata territory. 50 And according to local tradition, people from Kisar emigrated to the nearby Roma in old times, and gave rise to its population (Riedel 1886: 459-460) . This is at least partly confirmed by a VOC source which mentions a refugee population in Roma in 1681, perhaps in the wake of the Portuguese invasion. In yet another instance, dissatisfied Kisar sailed over to Tungur in east Wetar where Raja Salomon saw them as a great nuisance. The VOC was aversed to breaking up the Kisar population, and strongly recommended its elites to bring its people back from Roma and Wetar. 51 In short, the VOC had great difficulties controlling the movement of people and commodities in the region.
Concluding remarks
As this study has shown, the Wetar Straits which binds Timor to the islands in the north, abruptly turned into a border in the wake of the Topass-VOC clash in 1668-69. Like many similar colonial maritime borders in the West Indies, Southeast Asia, and others, it ossified despite not corresponding to cultural divisions, and has implications to this day. This was an aspect of the increasing power of the VOC in Maluku, and in other parts of maritime South and Southeast Asia, in the late 17th century. However, the process cannot merely be reduced to early colonial European strategy. Rather, we must see the events as an interplay between three spatial levels. Ultimately the process was determined by the efforts of the Dutch United Provinces and the VOC to maximise economic control in their sphere of interest, modified by diplomatic concerns. Regionally, the events entailed an undeclared war in Timor-Maluku, driven by Eurasian Portuguese ambition to delimit the 'Topasses Sea', and the aims of the Banda Dutch to win the coasts of the Wetar Straits and secure deliveries of slaves, sandalwood, beeswax, among other items. The partial failure of the Dutch to do this shows an interesting agility of the materially weaker Topass community which acted outside the official Estado da Índia. From a local perspective, the events demonstrate the possibilities for the agency of ethnic groups and individuals to use the Dutch-Portuguese tensions to their own advantage. Thus groups from the Alor islands alternated in their alliances to either assault or befriend Kisar and Wetar. Most significantly, the local leaders Bakker and Salomon employed a strategy of 'mutual parasitism' where they used the VOC presence and symbols of power to transgress the local consensus of their prerogatives while more or less accepting European interference in commercial transactions. This is paralleled by several early colonial frontiers where local groups were part of the power play and not merely victims of subordination, for example, among the Indians in the Great Lakes region in North America, or in Portuguese Timor (Hägerdal 2012: 415; Roque 2010) .
Why did these groups mostly choose an alliance with the VOC and even encouraged the dissemination of Christianity? Much of this is likely conditioned by concerns of security. In the fragmented and vulnerable world of East Timor and southern Maluku, mobile Southeast Asian groups such as the Alor and peoples from Sulawesi were not always seen as better alternatives to the Europeans. In spite of frequent exploitative practices by Dutch traders and soldiers, they could serve as a mediating and protective force in the best of worlds, perhaps with a regularity and predictability not found among the Portuguese. This is also suggested by local oral traditions. But there was also an element of state-avoidance which can be compared with the mainland hill groups studied by Scott (2009) , entailing strategies of withdrawal from central authorities combined with maintaining economic relations. Up to the 1660s, the islands around the Wetar Straits had ill-defined political affiliations but obvious cultural ones. People from Timor and the Southwest islands found refuge in each other's territories, often resettling under peaceful conditions, facilitated by linguistic affinities over the straits as well as the precolonial inter-island network maintained by the trading Kisar. The arrival of European and Eurasian powers, with the establishments of fortified posts in Kisar, Wetar and several places in Timor, broke much of the interaction. However, the early colonial authorities were not able to prevent migrations in spite of attempts to do so. To conclude, the often violent and oppressive nature of early colonial rule should not prevent us from discerning the irregularities of its application, and in the early stages of colonial expansion particularly, it must be analysed as a complicated sequence of negotiations and realignments.
